Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to document eaings management of Chinese firms.Design/methodology/approach-The paper takes advantage of the introduction of stringent delisting requirements around 2000 that non-cross-listed firms with consecutive eaings losses for more than two years would be delisted from the mainland Chinese exchanges.The paper examines whether listed firms in Chinese market manage eaings to avoid listings.The paper also examines whether mainland Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong exchanges manage eaings the same way.The measure for eaings management is derived from a keel density estimate for the retu on equity distribution,following Bollen and Pool (2009).Findings-The paper finds that the new delisting threats induce rampant eaings management on mainland markets,and cross-listing in Hong Kong has a curbing effect on eaings management.The paper also finds that prices became less value relevant after the implementation of delisting regulations,and investors rationally discounted the reliability of eaings announcements in China.Such market responses were absent for cross-listed firms in Hong Kong.Originality/value-There is little conclusive evidence about whether cross-listing in a non-US market has a curbing effect on eaings management.The paper contributes to this literature by using this unique exogenous policy change in China and following a difference-in-difference approach in identifying the potential curbing effect.The particular measure adapted from Bollen and Pool (2009) utilizes information of the whole distribution of retu on equity,thus extends earlier crude comparison of nearest two bars around zero and partially deals with the potential endogeneity problem.