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银企信贷关系中的信任,可以有效减少代理成本和机会主义行为,对缓解小微企业信贷约束有重要启示.提出一个银企间信任的博弈分析框架,从自利、互利和利他三方面分析信任的动机,并通过问卷调查实证检验银行信任对小微企业贷款可获得性的影响.结果表明:1)信任对信贷博弈均衡结果产生关键影响,双方较高的互利倾向和正的利他倾向可促使帕累托最优均衡的实现,且随着关系距离的拉近和信任的加深,双方利他与互利倾向逐渐增强,信任与合作可能演化为长期稳定均衡;2)银行信任对小微企业信贷获取的影响显著,高程度的信任有助于提升小微企业的申贷成功率.为小微企业信贷中的信任研究提供了有力证据,也为解决小微企业融资难问题提供了参考.
The trust in the credit relationship between banks and enterprises can effectively reduce agency costs and opportunistic behavior, and has an important enlightenment on alleviating the credit constraints of small and micro-sized enterprises.A game analysis framework of trust between banks and enterprises is proposed, which is analyzed from three aspects: self-interest, mutual benefit and altruism The motivation of trust and empirical test to verify the impact of bank trust on the availability of loans to small and micro enterprises.The results show that: 1) trust has a key impact on the equilibrium of credit game, both the higher tendency of reciprocity and the positive tendency of altruism can promote Pareto optimal balance achieved, and with the closer relationship between the distance and trust deepened, the two sides gradually increase the risk of mutual benefit and mutual benefit, trust and cooperation may evolve into a long-term stable equilibrium; 2) Bank trust access to small and micro enterprises credit Has a significant impact on the trustworthiness of small and microenterprises, which helps to improve the success rate of small and microenterprise loans.It provides strong evidence for the trust research in small and microenterprise credit and also provides a reference for solving the financing difficulty of small and microenterprise.