本文基于委托代理理论,从非效率投资视角考察了机构投资者的公司治理效应。研究发现:机构投资者能够发挥积极股东的监督作用,其持股比率与公司投资过度、投资不足程度显著负相关;相对于非国有控股的上市公司,机构投资者对国有控股上市公司非效率投资行为的监督与抑制受到限制。 Based on principal-agent theory, this paper examines the corporate governance effects of institutional investors from the perspective of inefficient investment. The study found that: Institutional investors can play an active role as supervisors of shareholders, and their shareholding ratio is significantly negatively correlated with over-investment and under-investment. Compared with non-state-controlled listed companies, institutional investors are not efficient in investing in state-controlled listed companies Supervision and inhibition of behavior is limited.