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为了保障天然气进口国的供应安全和经济持续稳定发展,本文建立了能综合考虑天然气储备对进口量和国内价格水平影响的模型,并利用最优控制原理,求得天然气进口国的最优进口量、储备量以及国内价格策略,结合比较静态分析和数值模拟,探讨了出口国垄断能力和进口国的供应中断风险厌恶程度对最优稳态储备规模、进口规模、国内天然气价格水平的影响。结果表明,在兼顾消费者剩余和供应安全总效用最大化的条件下,天然气储备将趋于长期最优稳态水平,且能避免进口天然气价格倒挂现象。随着进口国供应中断风险厌恶程度提高,天然气最优储备的积累速度将放缓,出口国垄断能力对最优策略的影响比进口国风险厌恶程度更加显著,最优稳态储备规模随出口国垄断能力的上升而下降。当出口国垄断能力足够高时,进口国的最优稳态进口量和国内价格水平不会随供应中断风险厌恶程度产生显著变化。
In order to ensure the supply security of natural gas importers and the sustained and steady economic development, this paper establishes a model that can comprehensively consider the effect of natural gas reserves on the import volume and the domestic price level, and uses the optimal control principle to find the optimal import volume of natural gas importers , Reserve quantity and domestic price strategy, the paper analyzes the monopoly power of exporters and the degree of risk aversion of suppliers in importing countries on the optimal steady-state reserve, import scale and domestic natural gas price level by comparative static analysis and numerical simulation. The results show that under the condition of maximizing the total utility of consumer surplus and supply security, the natural gas reserves will tend to the long-term optimal steady-state level and the upside-down of imported natural gas will be avoided. With the increasing risk of disruption of supply interruption risk in importing countries, the accumulation speed of optimal reserves of natural gas will slow down. The monopoly ability of exporting countries will have a more significant impact on the optimal strategy than the risk aversion of importing countries. The optimal steady state reserve scale will vary with exporting countries Monopoly ability to rise and decline. When the monopoly power of the exporting country is high enough, the optimal steady-state import volume and domestic price level in the importing country will not change significantly with the risk aversion of supply disruption.