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介绍了代建制工程项目管理模式的内涵和信息经济学中委托代理理论的基本逻辑,分析了代建高速公路业主与代建人的委托代理问题,构建了业主与代建人的委托代理基本模型并进行了改进。分析结果表明:可以将激励与监督机制有机地结合起来,一同纳入高速公路代建合同的设计中;激励与监督机制都能诱导或激发出代建人的努力;增加固定报酬对代建人的努力没有激励作用,但固定报酬是高速公路业主与代建人达成合作契约的前提;产出分享份额与监控信号在代建合同的制定中是相互关联的;监督措施会对代建人产生负面影响,高速公路业主可能需要补偿由于采用这些监督措施而引起代建人的效用损失。
This paper introduces the connotation of project management mode of agent construction project and the basic logic of principal-agent theory in information economics. It analyzes the principal-agent problem and the principal-agent model of agent and agent And made improvements. The results of the analysis show that: the incentive and supervision mechanism can be organically integrated into the design of expressway contract; both the incentive and supervision mechanism can induce or stimulate the efforts of the supervisor; Efforts have no incentive effect, but fixed compensation is the prerequisite for the highway owners and agents to reach a cooperation contract. The share of output sharing and the monitoring signals are interrelated in the formulation of the contract of construction agency. The supervision measures will have a negative effect on the agents As a result, highway owners may need to compensate for the loss of utility resulting from the use of these oversight measures.