当前地方政府的巨额债务已成为影响我国公共财政安全和社会经济的重大隐患。本文以预算软约束理论为视角,从传统的预算软约束和变异的预算软约束两个方面对我国地方政府过度负债偏好行为进行了分析,以探求其制度性根源。从这一新的视角出发,本文认为上述问题实际上是中央政府、地方政府、辖区内组织等各方各有期待、相互作用的结果,它是经济体制弊端和政府体制弊端混合体,解决问题的重中之重是政府体制改革。 At present, the huge debts of local governments have become major hidden dangers affecting the public finance safety and social economy in our country. From the perspective of budgetary soft constraints theory, this paper analyzes the over-liability preference behaviors of local governments in our country from two aspects of the traditional soft budget constraints and the soft budget constraints in order to explore its institutional roots. From this new perspective, this paper argues that the above problems are actually the result of expectations and interactions between the central government, local governments and organizations within their jurisdictions. It is a mixture of the drawbacks of the economic system and the disadvantages of the government system and the solution to the problem The most important thing is the reform of the government system.