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本文以我国2001—2010年配股和公开增发的上市公司为研究样本,研究了证券分析师发布OP报告(印在首次盈余预测时发布乐观报告而在末次盈余预测时发布悲观报告)的存在性及其动机。研究发现:证券分析师的这种“先扬后抑”的现象仅存在于国有企业样本中;而且在国有企业样本中,证券分析师出具OP报告的动机是获取私有信息,进而提高预测准确性。并且,当上市公司私有信患价值较高时,证券分析师更倾向于发布OP报告以取悦管理层来获取私有信息。此外,对国有企业发布OP报告的证券分析师进入“新财富最佳证券分析师”榜单的概率较高。本文的研究结论能够帮助我们更好地理解证券分析师的预测行为,并且有利于投资者做出合理的投资决策,对于监管机构出台有效的信患披露监管和约束政策也具有一定的借鉴意义。
In this paper, we take the 2001-2010 public placement of listed companies in China as the research sample, and study the existence of securities analyst’s OP report (printed optimistic report in the first earnings forecast and pessimistic report in the last earnings forecast) Its motivation. The study found that the “Xiangyanhouyan” phenomenon of the securities analyst exists only in the sample of state-owned enterprises. And in the sample of state-owned enterprises, the motivation of the securities analyst to issue the OP report is to obtain the private information and thus improve the forecast accuracy. And when private equity in listed companies is of high value, securities analysts are more likely to release OP reports to please management for private information. In addition, the probability of a securities analyst who issues an OP report to a state-owned firm is in the “New Fortune Best Securities Analyst” list. The conclusions of this paper can help us to better understand the forecast behavior of securities analysts, and help investors to make sound investment decisions, which is also of reference for regulators to put in place an effective regulation and restraint policy on information disclosure.