By analyzing block share transfers in China during 1999-2006,this study provides estimates of the private benefits of corporate control in China.We find that those controlling blocks are usually priced at a significant positive premium compared to those comparable non-controlling blocks.The benefits of corporate control vary with shareholders structure,firm characteristics and institutional variables.In particular,targets with a high intangible asset ratio have less benefits of control,cross-listing in B or H shares curbs the extract of private benefits and companies acquired by private firms are associated with higher private benefits.Moreover,it is found that benefits of control are negatively associated with market economy and factor market development index.We argue that firms with higher private benefits experience more tunneling activities by their controlling shareholders. By analyzing block share transfers in China during 1999-2006, this study provides estimates of the private benefits of corporate control in China. We find that those controlling blocks are usually priced at a significant positive premium compared to those comparable non-controlling blocks. benefits of corporate control vary with shareholders structure, firm characteristics and institutional variables. in particular, targets with a high intangible asset ratio have less benefits of control, cross-listing in B or H shares curbs the extract of private benefits and companies acquired by private firms are associated with higher private benefits. Moreover, it is found that benefits of control are negatively associated with market economy and factor market development index. We argue that firms with higher private benefits experience more tunneling activities by their controlling shareholders.