本文在考虑证券违规行为罚款额和监管成本不确定条件下,运用信息经济学理论,建立了证券监管人员报酬激励合约模型。通过模型,分析了我国证券监管人员在信息对称和信息不对称条件下的报酬激励合约的有关特征和相关解释。同时也分析了实施报酬激励合约的代理成本及其影响因素。 In this paper, considering the amount of fines and regulatory costs of securities violations under the conditions of the use of information economics theory, the establishment of a securities regulatory remuneration incentive contract model. Through the model, this paper analyzes the relevant characteristics and related explanations of compensation incentive contracts under the condition of information symmetry and information asymmetry in China’s securities regulators. At the same time, it also analyzes the agency costs and its influential factors in the implementation of remuneration incentive contracts.