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我们沿着Bertrand理论渊源构建模型,并以此为基础设计实验,在实验室环境中检验产品差异度与双寡头厂商的行为。论文首先分析模型的理论值,其次在实验市场中进行了设置检验。实验结果表明:(1)产品差异度越小,双寡头厂商的博弈平均价格就越低,该价格在重复博弈纳什均衡区间的中间价格附近波动;(2)博弈期数越多,博弈双方的冲突反而越大,这与俗定理预测相悖;(3)对背叛行为的惩罚具有普遍性,惩罚策略主要是针锋相对,惩罚强度随产品差异度减小而增强;(4)产品差异度对共谋的稳定性影响不显著,这与理论预测相悖;(5)折现与平均价格及共谋的关系模糊。
We build models along the Bertrand theory and use it as a basis for designing experiments that examine product differentiation and duopoly vendors’ behavior in a lab environment. The dissertation first analyzes the theoretical value of the model and secondly tests the settings in the experimental market. The experimental results show that: (1) the smaller the product variance, the lower the average bidding price of duopoly firms, which fluctuates around the middle price of the repeated game Nash equilibrium interval; (2) The more game periods, the more (3) The punishment of betrayal is universal, the punishment strategy is mainly tit-for-tat, and the intensity of punishment is enhanced with the decrease of product differentiation; (4) The difference of product to collusion The stability of the impact is insignificant, which is contrary to the theoretical prediction; (5) the relationship between discount and average price and collusion fuzzy.