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1973年10月发生的第四次中东战争,是一场较大规模的现代化局部战争。战争中阿军(埃及、叙利亚)成功的突然袭击,人们至今仍记忆犹新;同样,以色列军向运河西岸实施大纵深突击,一举变被动为主动,在军事学术中也留下了独特的创造性经验。在前三次中东战争中,以军一直是处于十分主动的地位,而第四次中东战争初,以军却陷于极其被动的地位,这不是偶然的。第三次中东战争结束后,以军作战思想开始发生变化。此时,以军占领了数倍于自己国土的阿拉伯地区,拥有一定的战略纵深和屏障,以色列最高决策层对战略问题出现了两派意见。以塔尔和
The Fourth Middle East War that took place in October 1973 is a large-scale modernized partial war. In the wake of the successful surprise attack by the A-armies (Egypt and Syria) in the war, people still remember it. Similarly, the Israeli army conducted a profound assault on the west bank of the canal, turning its back from being passive and active and leaving unique creativity in military academy experience. In the previous three Middle East wars, the Israeli army has been in a very active position. However, it was no accident that the Israeli military was in a very passive position at the beginning of the Fourth Middle East War. After the third Middle East War, the idea of the war on troops began to change. At this time, the Israeli military occupy several times as many Arab countries in its own territory, with a certain degree of strategic depth and barriers. The top Israeli decision-makers on the strategic issues emerged two views. To Thal and