自2011年起国家投入大量资金实施草原生态保护补助奖励政策,通过给牧民发放补贴,鼓励牧民减少牲畜,恢复退化草原,但经过五年后一些地方牲畜数量不降反增。本文基于对内蒙古锡林郭勒盟太仆寺旗G苏木的案例调查发现,草原生态保护补助奖励政策的实施结束了当地坚持多年的社区草原共管机制,外来户不断增加和牧户竞相贷款增畜,管理陷于瘫痪。为何意在保护生态的生态补偿政策反而刺激了草场资源的过度利用,其原因正是生态补偿政策通过商品化草场资源的价值,试图用补贴购买生态服务,扰乱了原有的社会系统和生态系统的内部运作和相互依存关系,产生了不可持续的社会和生态结果,导致商品化悲剧的出现。 Since 2011, the state has invested a great deal of funds in implementing grassland eco-protection subsidy rewards policies, encouraging pastoralists to reduce livestock and restore degraded grasslands by subsidizing pastoralists. However, after five years, the number of livestock in some places did not fall by the contrary. Based on the case study of Tahemiaoqi G Hemu in Xilin Gol League in Inner Mongolia, this paper finds that the implementation of the reward policy of grassland eco-protection subsidy has ended the local community grassroots co-management mechanism that has been adhering to for many years. Why eco-compensation policy intends to protect the ecology instead stimulates over-utilization of grassland resources is precisely because the eco-compensation policy attempts to purchase eco-services through subsidies and disrupts the existing social systems and ecosystems The internal operation and interdependence have had unsustainable social and ecological consequences, leading to the emergence of a commercial tragedy.