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联合生产领域的背叛通常是合作基础上的背叛,现有的合作博弈模型与非合作博弈模型均不易进行较好地刻画。为此,构建了一个非完全合作的两人博弈模型,用于刻画联合生产时既要偷工减料又不能使联合关系破裂的经济现象。文中给出了基于收益和回报率两个版本的博弈模型,分析了参数对模型特征的影响。基于回报率模型,研究了BA无标度网络上的演化博弈,分析了合作密度对模型参数的依赖关系。揭示了电子联合生产领域偷工减料以次充好的现实问题。
The betrayal in joint production is usually betrayal on the basis of cooperation. The existing cooperative game model and non-cooperative game model are not easy to depict. To this end, a non-fully cooperated two-person game model is constructed, which is used to characterize the economic phenomenon of joint production not only to cut corners but not to rupture the joint relationship. In this paper, a game model based on two versions of return and return is given, and the influence of parameters on model characteristics is analyzed. Based on the rate of return model, the evolutionary game on BA scale-free networks is studied and the dependence of cooperation density on the model parameters is analyzed. Revealed the reality of shoddy construction in the field of electronic co-production.