将自由秩序原则运用于城市规划中,这是一个富于挑战性的难题,也是政府干预、破坏自生自发秩序演进的重点领域。本文通过对哈耶克《自由秩序原理》第二十二章的解读,梳理了哈耶克对此问题的理论探讨及其现实解决方案,并引进和展开了交易成本范式,将问题聚焦到“集体一致性同意”和“一对多的捆绑交易”问题上,指出了“哈耶克解”所存在的问题。本文认为,城市规划作为公共品,由政府提供具有确当性,但是,政府制定城市规划的确当性,并不意味着政府拥有无限的、无制约的规划权力,必须要给以自生自发秩序演进的空间。本文通过对中国城市规划现实分析,指出当政府拥有无限的、无制约的规划权力所产生的一系列行为扭曲。同时,本文针对中国城市规划建设中城市更新问题,探讨了“奥斯特罗姆解”的含义及其可行性,以及城市规划师的重要作用。本文的研究表明,通过一系列的策略安排,充分利用分散的知识,建立多主体的、分散的、零打碎敲的城市规划管理体系是具有较强的现实政策意义。 Applying the principle of freedom to urban planning is a challenging problem and a key area for government intervention to undermine the evolution of spontaneous order. Through the interpretation of chapter twenty-two of Hayek’s “Principles of freedom and order”, this paper combs Hayek’s theoretical exploration and practical solutions, introduces and develops the transaction cost paradigm, “Collective agreement” and “one to many bundled transactions” issue, pointed out that the “Hayek solution” existing problems. This paper argues that urban planning as a public good is provided by the government with certainty. However, the government’s properness in formulating urban planning does not mean that the government has unlimited and unfettered planning power. It must be given the status of spontaneous spontaneous order evolution space. This article analyzes the reality of urban planning in China and points out that when the government has unlimited and unconstrained planning power, the series of behaviors distorted. At the same time, this paper discusses the meaning and feasibility of “Ostrom solution ” and the important role of urban planner in the urban renewal of urban planning and construction in China. The research in this paper shows that through a series of strategic arrangements, making full use of scattered knowledge and establishing a multi-agent, decentralized and zero-break urban planning and management system is of strong realistic policy significance.