论文部分内容阅读
将产品市场区分为专利保护完善市场与专利保护不完善市场,基于自主创新企业与后进企业市场地位不等的前提,建立了创新企业在面对后进企业可能通过仿制进入市场时的专利许可定价模型,并通过比较不同情形下两企业的利润得到创新企业的专利许可定价区间。分析指出,当处于专利保护完善的市场中,创新企业对专利许可费率的定价若满足某一特定范围,则能促使两企业都愿意以费率许可的方式生产,从而形成合作博弈,实现市场总利润最优;当专利保护不完善时,创新企业可以通过对专利许可费率或固定费用的合理定价,避免后进企业仿制的发生,并且当新产品市场利润足够大时,给予后进企业一定补贴来促使其放弃仿制也是值得的。
The product market is divided into patent protection perfect market and imperfect patent protection market. Based on the premise of the market position of independent innovation enterprises and backward enterprises, a patent licensing pricing model of innovative enterprises in the face of backward enterprises entering the market through imitation is established , And obtained the patent licensing price range of innovative enterprises by comparing the profits of the two enterprises in different situations. It is pointed out that when in the market with perfect patent protection, if the pricing of patent licensing rate of innovative enterprises satisfies a certain range, it will make both enterprises willing to produce by the way of rate permit, so as to form a cooperative game and realize the market When the patent protection is not perfect, innovative enterprises can avoid the imitation of backward enterprises by reasonably pricing the patent license fee or fixed fee, and subsidize the backward enterprises when the profit of the new product market is large enough It is also worthwhile to encourage them to give up imitation.