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针对虚拟企业中道德风险和逆向选择并存下的双重信息不对称问题,结合Stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,分别建立了相应的基于盟员的私有信息和行动的两种策略下的两阶段委托代理监督模型激励盟员,并甄别其私有信息.求解模型并将两种监督策略与不监督的情形比较,证明了盟主委托监理组织对盟员的监督是有效的,且基于行动的监督策略更有效.通过算例表明上述结果对虚拟企业的运营实践具有很好的指导意义.
Aiming at the problem of asymmetric information under the coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection in virtual enterprise, a two-stage principal-agent based on the two strategies of private information and action is established based on Stackelberg game theory and incentive mechanism. The supervisory model motivates the alliance members and screened their private information.Comparing the two supervisory strategies with the non-supervisory ones, it proves that it is effective for the supervisor to supervise the supervising supervising supervising organization and that the action-based supervising strategy is more effective The example shows that the above results have very good guiding significance for the operation of virtual enterprises.