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本文针对我国大股东侵占中小股东权益的普遍现象,通过建立一个理论框架,对大股东与经理合谋共同侵占少数股东权益的机制进行了具体的分析,并结合中国的实际情况,对大股东的选择机制进行了计量检验。实证结果显示,大股东确实通过牟取控制权收益而侵害了少数股东的权益,对经理的监督和激励存在非对称性;公司内部治理状况、监督程度和信息披露水平对大股东和经理的行为模式有非常显著的影响。
This article aims at the general phenomenon that our major shareholders encroach on the rights and interests of the minority shareholders, establishes a theoretical framework, analyzes the mechanism that the major shareholders and the manager conspire to jointly encroach on the minority shareholders’ rights and interests, and combines the reality of China with the choice of major shareholders Mechanism for the measurement test. The empirical results show that the majority shareholder really infringed the rights and interests of the minority shareholders by reaping the benefits of control, and there was asymmetry in the supervision and motivation of the manager. The internal governance status, the degree of supervision and the level of information disclosure on the behaviors of major shareholders and managers Have a very significant impact.