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市场约束和政府干预是目前中国商业银行的两种外部治理机制,这两种外部机制对商业银行风险承担的影响是一个重要的问题。研究发现:由于我国存在的隐性存款保险制度和市场制度的不完善,政府干预显著的增加了银行的风险,而市场的约束作用比较弱,其中全国股份制商业银行受政府的干预比较少,但城市商业银行受到政府干预的程度较高,显著的增加了其风险。同时从分组回归的结果我们也发现在2005年之后政府干预机制逐渐减弱,而市场的价格约束机制逐渐增强。
Market constraints and government intervention are two types of external governance mechanisms currently in commercial banks in China. The impact of these two external mechanisms on the exposure of commercial banks is an important issue. The study finds that due to the imperfect recessive deposit insurance system and market system in our country, the government intervention significantly increases the bank’s risk, but the market restraint effect is relatively weak. The national joint-stock commercial banks intervene less by the government, The high degree of government intervention by city commercial banks has significantly increased their risks. At the same time, we also find that the government intervention mechanism gradually weakened after 2005 and the price restraint mechanism in the market gradually increased.