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“波特假说”认为,合理的环境规制能够促进企业的研发投入,激发“创新补偿”效应。本文以2009~2014年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,检验了环境规制和产品市场竞争对企业研发投入的影响,并进一步分析了环境规制对产品市场竞争与企业研发投入之间关系的调节效应。通过实证检验,本文认为:环境规制与企业研发投入之间存在U型关系,仅当环境规制强度跨越特定门槛值时,“波特假说”才能够实现;产品市场竞争对企业研发投入具有显著的促进作用,但是环境规制会弱化产品市场竞争对企业研发投入的正向影响,并且这种弱化作用在市场化程度较低的地区更为显著。为提高企业研发投入强度,在完善环境规制制度的同时,需要规范政府行为,减少过度干预,优化外部治理环境,发挥市场的自主性。
“Porter hypothesis ” think, reasonable environmental regulation can promote enterprise’s research and development investment, inspire “innovation compensation ” effect. This paper examines the impact of environmental regulation and product market competition on R & D investment of enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014, and further analyzes the relationship between environmental regulation on product market competition and R & D investment The regulatory effect. Through empirical test, this paper argues that there is a U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and R & D investment. Only when the intensity of environmental regulation crosses a certain threshold, can the “Porter Hypothesis” be realized; However, environmental regulation will weaken the positive impact of product market competition on R & D investment, and this weakening effect is more significant in the less marketed areas. In order to improve the R & D investment intensity of enterprises, while perfecting the environmental regulation system, it is necessary to regulate government behaviors, reduce over-intervention, optimize the external governance environment and give full play to the market autonomy.