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本文以Jensen & Meckling(1976)代理理论为基础,研究了控股股东配股比例对配股发行定价的影响。根据本文所建立的理论模型,在部分认购配股情况下,控股股东为补偿因放弃配股所导致的剩余索取权损失,会提高配股发行价格,导致公司的规模不经济,造成公司价值损失。本文以1998—2001年进行配股的中国上市公司为样本,研究结果表明,随着控股股东配股认购比例的下降,配股发行折价也随之下降,即配股价格上升。研究结果支持了本文所提出的配股发行定价代理模型。
Based on the agency theory of Jensen & Meckling (1976), this paper studies the effect of the controlling shareholder’s rights issue ratio on the issue price of the rights issue. According to the theoretical model established in this article, in the case of partial placement of shares, the controlling shareholder will increase the issue price of the rights issue to compensate for the loss of the residual claim arising from the abandonment of the rights issue, resulting in the diseconomy of the company and loss of the value of the company. This paper takes the Chinese listed companies that made the allotment in 1998-2001 as a sample. The result shows that with the decrease of the subscription ratio of the controlling shareholders, the issue price of the rights issue also decreases, that is, the price of the rights issue rises. The results support the placement-based issue pricing proxy model proposed in this paper.