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本文以2006~2012年A股上市公司为样本,考察了公司政治治理(党委书记参与公司治理)对公司审计费用的影响,以及这种影响如何因法律环境的不同而发生改变。通过分析党委书记参与公司治理这一政治治理机制,本文提出两个竞争性的假设:市场压力假设和有效监督假设。研究发现,总体上,党委书记参与公司治理程度越高,公司承担的审计费用越多,但是,随着公司所在地区法律环境的改善,公司政治治理对审计收费的正面影响有所减弱,实证结果支持市场压力假设。研究结果表明,对中国新兴加转轨的特殊制度背景而言,公司政治治理(尤其是党委书记兼任董事长或总经理)这一制度安排导致内部代理冲突,降低了内部公司治理作用的发挥,从而使得公司迫于市场压力有动机寻求高质量的外部审计作为替代。本文的研究一定程度上丰富了嵌于企业政治行为的公司治理理论,其研究结果为政府监管部门、上市公司治理及企业党建工作的开展等方面提供有益参考。
This paper takes A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2012 as samples to examine the impact of corporate governance (the involvement of party committees in corporate governance) on the audit fees of the company, and how this impact will change due to different legal environments. By analyzing the participation of party secretary in the political governance mechanism of corporate governance, this paper proposes two competitive hypotheses: the hypothesis of market pressure and the hypothesis of effective supervision. The study found that, overall, the higher the level of party secretary involvement in corporate governance, the higher the audit costs borne by the company, but with the improvement of the legal environment in the company’s region, the positive impact of the company’s political governance on audit fees weakened, the empirical results Support for market pressure assumptions. The results show that for the special institutional background of emerging and increasing transition in China, the institutional arrangement of corporate political governance (especially party secretary as chairman or general manager) leads to internal agency conflicts and reduces the role of internal corporate governance, thus As a result, companies are motivated by market pressure to seek high-quality external audits as alternatives. The research of this article enriches the theory of corporate governance embedded in corporate political behavior to a certain extent. The research results provide useful references for government regulatory agencies, the governance of listed companies and the development of corporate party building.