论文部分内容阅读
本文构建了单期下考虑地方政府隐匿信息时,存在中央政府隐性担保的最优监管契约模型,结果表明,单期下,显示原理(Revelation Principle)是可以被激励契约促成的;进一步地,本文以单期模型为基准,构建了两期下的最优监管契约模型,结果表明,重复博弈下,存在高收入地方政府的策略均衡使得中央政府能够实现分离均衡的惩罚范围相比单期模型有所扩大。也就是说,声誉效应确实促进了逆向选择减弱,因此,中央政府只需要更小的惩罚力度,就能促使地方政府报告真实类型,信息的充分披露对整个社会的福利也是有促进作用的。
This paper constructs an optimal regulatory contract model under the concealed guarantee of the central government under single-period considering the hidden information of the local government. The results show that the Revelation Principle can be stimulated by the incentive contract under the single-period; furthermore, Based on the single-period model, this paper constructs the optimal regulatory contract model under two periods. The results show that under the repeated game, the policy equilibrium of high-income local governments makes the central government to achieve the separation of punishment range compared with the single-period model Has been expanded. In other words, the effect of reputation does promote the reduction of adverse selection. Therefore, the central government only needs less punishment to urge the local government to report the true type, and the full disclosure of information can also promote the welfare of the entire society.