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提出了对亚洲密码学会2010给出的一个基于格的群签名方案的攻击,表明了已有的群签名不能防止陷害攻击,不诚实的群管理员可以得到所有群成员的签名秘钥进而伪造出所有群成员的合法签名.该方案也不能灵活有效地增删群成员,每新增一个群成员,系统需要更新系统公钥和所有群成员的签名密钥,计算量大,效率低,同时该方案也未给出有效删除群成员的方法,不适用于实际中的动态群.基于格上最近向量问题的困难性,利用统计零知识证明,同时引入时间参数,给出了一种改进方案,新方案可以有效抵御陷害攻击,能够实现动态增加或删除群成员,且效率更高,实用性更强.
Proposed an attack on a lattice-based group signature scheme given by Cryptography Society of Asia in 2010, which shows that the existing group signature can not prevent fraudulent attacks. The dishonest group administrator can obtain the signature keys of all the group members and then forge This scheme can not add or delete group members flexibly and efficiently. For each new group member, the system needs to update the system public key and the signature keys of all group members, so it is computationally expensive and inefficient. At the same time, Nor does it give a method to effectively delete group members, which is not applicable to the dynamic group in practice.On the basis of the difficulty of the nearest vector problem on the lattice, using the statistical zero knowledge proof and introducing the time parameters, an improved scheme is proposed, The scheme can effectively resist fraudulent attacks and can increase or delete group members dynamically, and is more efficient and practical.