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针对二级供应链,在基于Stackelberg博弈的批发价契约中,分析了折扣价格与零售商最优提前订购量的关系及对契约双方期望收益的影响;设计了价格折扣与回购联合的协调契约,分析了供应链系统的最优提前生产量、供应链协调条件及协调契约下制造商和零售商的期望收益变化,并在协调契约不满足制造商的个体理性约束时,提出采用不对称Nash谈判模型设计两阶段生产与订购的回购契约,在保证供应链系统整体绩效最优的条件下,使制造商和零售商利润都能得到满意增长。研究表明,三级供应链实行两阶段订购的必要条件是分销商与零售商的最优提前订购量相等,与二级供应链相比,价格折扣契约下三级供应链效率更低,但价格折扣与回购联合的契约同样能协调三级供应链,该协调契约满足零售商与分销商激励相容约束。
According to the wholesale price contract based on Stackelberg game, this paper analyzes the relationship between the discount price and the retailer’s optimal advance order quantity and the impact on the expected return of the two parties. A coordination contract is designed which combines the price discount and the repo , Analyzed the optimal early production capacity of supply chain system, the coordination conditions of supply chain and the expected earnings changes of manufacturers and retailers under the coordination contract. When the coordination contract does not satisfy the individual rational constraints of manufacturers, this paper proposes the use of asymmetric Nash The negotiation model designs a two-stage repo contract for both production and subscription, enabling both the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve satisfactory growth in profitability while ensuring the overall optimal performance of the supply chain system. The research shows that the necessary condition for three-stage supply chain to implement two-stage ordering is that the optimal order quantity of distributors and retailers is equal. Compared with the two-tier supply chain, the three-level supply chain under the price discount contract is less efficient, but the price The contract of discount and repo can also coordinate the three-level supply chain, which can satisfy the retailer-distributor incentive compatibility constraint.