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With President Xi Jinping planning to attend the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit U.S. President Barack Obama will have hosted， China’s top leaders will have personally participated in each of the summits. The attention paid by the Chinese Government to nuclear terrorism is unprecedented.
In his landmark speech in Prague in 2009， Obama declared nuclear terrorism as “the single most important threat” to U.S. national security. Back then， China seemed to have a different mindset.
Traditional Chinese thinking on security has long focused on managing geostrategic threats posed by states. Dealing with the possibility of non-state actors that try to illegally obtain nuclear and radioactive materials and use them to conduct terrorist attacks was not high on China’s priorities. However， this perception has changed over the last several years.
Growing threats
Against the background of a worldwide resurgence of religious extremism and terrorism， China—like many countries—is facing an increasing threat of both international and domestic terrorism. Given the global nature of terrorism， weaknesses in nuclear security in one country could allow a terrorist attack to happen on another， including on Chinese territory.
Moreover， China itself possesses a large number of radioactive sources for industrial and civilian use， the protection of which would be greatly enhanced by adopting international practices. China also has the world’s most ambitious nuclear energy development program. That creates considerable challenges in building a fail-proof system to protect every nuclear facility at all stages of the fuel cycle to prevent materials from falling into the wrong hands. As a result， preventing nuclear terrorism and enhancing the security of these resources is a key national security interest， and its importance continues to grow.
Increased appreciation of the importance of nuclear security has led to China taking more precautions and adopting stricter regulations. The newly released white paper on nuclear emergency responses sheds light on some recent efforts. Nonetheless， the difference in views between China and some Western countries about the best approach to addressing nuclear security challenges is holding them back from deeper cooperation. For instance， China seems somewhat skeptical about the wisdom of drawing public attention to and highlighting existing nuclear security weaknesses， fearing that doing so would inadvertently raise security risks by revealing vulnerabilities and enlightening potential saboteurs. Common agenda
Looking toward the future， a summit like this provides an opportunity for China and other key international players to formulate a common agenda for further cooperation. This may help to reduce Beijing’s concern about Washington’s dominance in this arena and create the conditions for China to play a more proactive role internationally. Beijing’s foreign policy principles have long advocated for multilateralism and for a greater role for international organizations， as opposed to domination by one or two countries.
The summit is likely to raise awareness of the security challenges posed by non-civilian nuclear materials—more than 80 percent of existing nuclear material stockpile in the world are used or reserved for military purposes. China has completely stopped the production of military fissile materials for nuclear weapons since the 1990s， but has not received any political credit for doing so. An official acknowledgement of this fact—possibly included in its formal statement at the summit—would enhance its reputation for showing transparency. A further announcement about the approximate size of China’s existing fissile material stockpile would also be prudent.
As cyber threats to civilian nuclear infrastructure increase， China could work with others to establish common understandings and norms that regulate behavior in this cross-cutting area. A code of conduct prohibiting cyber attacks against civilian nuclear facilities is absolutely necessary to address the issue before it is too late. It would also contribute to confidencebuilding among concerned partners. Beijing reached high-level common understanding with Washington in 2015 about the importance of establishing rules in cyberspace including prohibiting cyber attack on critical infrastructure.
China’s leadership role in promoting nuclear security could also be enhanced through engaging in deeper regional cooperation. In this regard， South Asia is a region that requires direct attention. Both India and Pakistan possess large quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials and face significant potential threats from nonstate actors. As China’s immediate neighbor， South Asia is becoming increasingly connected with China. But that presents risks of potentially facilitating cross-border nuclear terrorism. Direct dialogue would go a long way toward addressing local nuclear security threats， should they appear.
Last but not least， China is increasingly capable of providing common benefits in the field of nuclear security. It could undertake capacitybuilding cooperation with regional countries and other international players to train nuclear security personnel and to promote best practices. The China-U.S. Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in Beijing， for example， provides a place where such capacity building cooperation could take place. Joint research on nuclear forensics and radioactive detection technology is the type of technical cooperation that has the potential to contribute to trust-building at the political level.
By actively engaging in efforts to improve comprehensive nuclear security， China will be better positioned to play a leadership role in addressing this common threat faced by all.
In his landmark speech in Prague in 2009， Obama declared nuclear terrorism as “the single most important threat” to U.S. national security. Back then， China seemed to have a different mindset.
Traditional Chinese thinking on security has long focused on managing geostrategic threats posed by states. Dealing with the possibility of non-state actors that try to illegally obtain nuclear and radioactive materials and use them to conduct terrorist attacks was not high on China’s priorities. However， this perception has changed over the last several years.
Growing threats
Against the background of a worldwide resurgence of religious extremism and terrorism， China—like many countries—is facing an increasing threat of both international and domestic terrorism. Given the global nature of terrorism， weaknesses in nuclear security in one country could allow a terrorist attack to happen on another， including on Chinese territory.
Moreover， China itself possesses a large number of radioactive sources for industrial and civilian use， the protection of which would be greatly enhanced by adopting international practices. China also has the world’s most ambitious nuclear energy development program. That creates considerable challenges in building a fail-proof system to protect every nuclear facility at all stages of the fuel cycle to prevent materials from falling into the wrong hands. As a result， preventing nuclear terrorism and enhancing the security of these resources is a key national security interest， and its importance continues to grow.
Increased appreciation of the importance of nuclear security has led to China taking more precautions and adopting stricter regulations. The newly released white paper on nuclear emergency responses sheds light on some recent efforts. Nonetheless， the difference in views between China and some Western countries about the best approach to addressing nuclear security challenges is holding them back from deeper cooperation. For instance， China seems somewhat skeptical about the wisdom of drawing public attention to and highlighting existing nuclear security weaknesses， fearing that doing so would inadvertently raise security risks by revealing vulnerabilities and enlightening potential saboteurs. Common agenda
Looking toward the future， a summit like this provides an opportunity for China and other key international players to formulate a common agenda for further cooperation. This may help to reduce Beijing’s concern about Washington’s dominance in this arena and create the conditions for China to play a more proactive role internationally. Beijing’s foreign policy principles have long advocated for multilateralism and for a greater role for international organizations， as opposed to domination by one or two countries.
The summit is likely to raise awareness of the security challenges posed by non-civilian nuclear materials—more than 80 percent of existing nuclear material stockpile in the world are used or reserved for military purposes. China has completely stopped the production of military fissile materials for nuclear weapons since the 1990s， but has not received any political credit for doing so. An official acknowledgement of this fact—possibly included in its formal statement at the summit—would enhance its reputation for showing transparency. A further announcement about the approximate size of China’s existing fissile material stockpile would also be prudent.
As cyber threats to civilian nuclear infrastructure increase， China could work with others to establish common understandings and norms that regulate behavior in this cross-cutting area. A code of conduct prohibiting cyber attacks against civilian nuclear facilities is absolutely necessary to address the issue before it is too late. It would also contribute to confidencebuilding among concerned partners. Beijing reached high-level common understanding with Washington in 2015 about the importance of establishing rules in cyberspace including prohibiting cyber attack on critical infrastructure.
China’s leadership role in promoting nuclear security could also be enhanced through engaging in deeper regional cooperation. In this regard， South Asia is a region that requires direct attention. Both India and Pakistan possess large quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials and face significant potential threats from nonstate actors. As China’s immediate neighbor， South Asia is becoming increasingly connected with China. But that presents risks of potentially facilitating cross-border nuclear terrorism. Direct dialogue would go a long way toward addressing local nuclear security threats， should they appear.
Last but not least， China is increasingly capable of providing common benefits in the field of nuclear security. It could undertake capacitybuilding cooperation with regional countries and other international players to train nuclear security personnel and to promote best practices. The China-U.S. Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in Beijing， for example， provides a place where such capacity building cooperation could take place. Joint research on nuclear forensics and radioactive detection technology is the type of technical cooperation that has the potential to contribute to trust-building at the political level.
By actively engaging in efforts to improve comprehensive nuclear security， China will be better positioned to play a leadership role in addressing this common threat faced by all.