随着公司所有权与经营权不断分离,委托代理问题日益成为人们关注的话题,剩余索取权与剩余控制权的分离使得投资者与经营者利益存在冲突,从而导致代理成本高昂。近年来,对委托代理关系的研究较多,研究者从不同角度给出了相应的理论假设和政策建议,但是本质上代理问题仍然没有得到有效 With the continuous separation of corporate ownership and management rights, the issue of principal-agent has increasingly become a topic of concern. The separation of residual claims and residual control conflicts with the interests of investors and operators, resulting in high agency costs. In recent years, there have been many researches on the relationship between principal-agent and agency, and the researchers have given corresponding theoretical assumptions and policy suggestions from different perspectives, but in essence the agency problem is still not validated