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本文从基金管理公司利益操纵及其控股股东利益输送两个角度解释我国证券市场封闭式基金的折价交易现象,并进行了相应的实证检验。研究表明市场确实对于潜在的利益输送有着负面的反应,一旦基金管理公司开始发行开放式基金,则该公司管理的封闭式基金折价率显著提高。证券公司控股的基金管理公司管理的封闭式基金的折价率也显著高于其他类型的基金管理公司管理的封闭式基金。本文还就如何避免和减少利益操纵和利益输送行为提出若干建议,以进一步推动我国封闭式基金的发展和规范基金管理公司管理运作。
This paper explains the phenomenon of the discount trading of the closed-end funds in China’s securities market from the perspective of the interest management of the fund management companies and the transfer of interests of its controlling shareholders, and conducts a corresponding empirical test. Research shows that the market does have a negative reaction to the potential transfer of benefits, and that once the fund management company begins to issue open-end funds, the discount rate of the closed-end funds managed by the company rises significantly. The closed-end funds managed by fund management companies controlled by securities firms also have a much lower discount rate than the closed-end funds managed by other types of fund management companies. This article also put forward some suggestions on how to avoid and reduce the interest manipulation and the transfer of benefits in order to further promote the development of China’s closed-end funds and standardize the management of fund management companies.