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考虑电子商务环境下网络销售潜在的波动性和物流服务特点,引入额外供应成本分担因素,对在线零售商和物流提供商的配送能力建立博弈模型,分别讨论双方在非合作和合作情形下的均衡解及其与相关参数的关系。分析论证在完全独立决策下,在线零售商不会分担物流提供商的额外供应成本;在Stackelberg博弈下,在线零售商的收益要大于完全独立决策的情形,而物流提供商的收益需要满足一定的条件才有改进;在合作博弈下,供应链的整体收益最大,并且存在具有Pareto改进的均衡解。
Considering the potential volatility of online sales and the characteristics of logistics service in e-commerce environment, this paper introduces the additional factors of cost allocation and establishes a game model for the distribution ability of online retailers and logistics providers. They discuss the balance of non-cooperation and cooperation Solution and its relationship with related parameters. Analysis and argumentation In the completely independent decision-making, online retailers will not share the additional supply costs of logistics providers; under the Stackelberg game, the revenue of online retailers will be greater than that of completely independent decision-making, and the revenue of logistics providers will need to meet a certain The conditions only improve; Under the cooperative game, the overall return of the supply chain is the largest, and there is an equilibrium solution with Pareto improvement.