本文建立了一个简单的产业组织经济学模型来讨论中国分权化改革过程中地区竞争与地方保护主义的经济后果。本文发现,相对于国家垄断而言,在规模报酬递减的技术下,地区竞争一般会带来社会福利的提高;而在规模报酬递增的技术下,地区竞争更有可能降低了社会福利。而地方保护主义会削弱甚至逆转地区竞争相对于国家垄断的效率优势。 This essay establishes a simple economic model of industrial organization to discuss the economic consequences of regional competition and local protectionism during the reform of decentralization in China. This paper finds that, compared with state monopolies, under the technology of diminishing returns to scale, regional competition generally brings about an increase in social welfare; while under the technology of increasing returns to scale, regional competition is more likely to reduce social welfare. Local protectionism will weaken or even reverse the efficiency advantage of regional competition over state monopoly.