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The Chinese Government’s policy approach to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea （DPRK） has been under debate since the latter conducted its third nuclear test in February. Some critics accused China of “indulging” the DPRK for years instead of restraining and sanctioning it along with other countries， neglecting to effectively “guide”Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policies.
According to them， China’s DPRK policy during the past decades has resulted in failure， suggesting that China should be held respon- sible for instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by the DPRK’s radical behavior. Their understanding is one-sided and incorrect. The critics have missed the point of China’s interests in the DPRK and misunderstood the core of peninsula issues.
Effective policy
The central goal of China’s DPRK policy is to sustain the steady development of bilateral relations. The DPRK is an important partner in China’s foreign strategy and a key point in its diplomacy with neighboring countries. Regardless of the experiences and beliefs of each side， they are neighbors. China cannot simply abandon the DPRK as other governments have done， nor treat the DPRK like a dependent child. It will continue with the current state of communication based on equality and mutual respect.
As a small country， the DPRK’s mentality is particularly sensitive and complicated. It tends to categorize China’s suggestions and different ideas with the label of bully. Although it occasionally lashes out with a temper， it has never diverged from the normal track of China-DPRK relations.
Beijing always stresses the importance of these relations. It welcomes Pyongyang’s increased efforts to promote development， raise people’s living standards， improve its external environment， and conduct normal communication with other countries. It has consistently carried out necessary persuasive actions with Pyongyang in keeping with the strategy of balancing national interests with diplomatic principles. It never seeks to impose its view or development model on Pyongyang. Perhaps China’s influence on the DPRK will not be apparent at once， but the effects will show in time.
The late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il visited China many times， mainly to observe China’s reform and development progress. He also repeatedly urged the DPRK’s younger genera- tion to cherish the China-DPRK relationship and learn more from China’s experience. Current DPRK leader Kim Jong Un most likely shares the same attitude. Now the DPRK has begun to show signs of revitalization， especially since the younger Kim took office. These results could not flourish with a failed DPRK policy. Pushing for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an important goal of China’s DPRK policy. The DPRK nuclear issue has existed for decades， since before the Cold War ended 22 years ago. But the Korean Peninsula has remained in a Cold War state， with lingering hostility between Washington and Pyongyang and between Pyongyang and Seoul.
In spite of the difficulties， China has insisted on mediation through a bilateral channel and the sixparty talks， and succeeded in slowing down the DPRK’s pace of possessing nuclear weapons and discouraging Seoul’s desire to do the same. Its efforts have helped avoid a deteriorating situation， such as a nuclear arms race or even a military conflict on the peninsula. In this sense， China’s DPRK policy is a success， not a failure.
Crucial talks
The six-party talks， initiated and hosted by China， have become the most important platform for China to pursue its DPRK policy. It is already an astonishing feat that the six-party talks have managed to bring the opposing parties together for serious discussions， providing an influence on the Northeast Asian situation since they started 10 years ago. The roadmap to denuclearization and the principle of “commitment for commitment， action for action”adopted during the six-party talks are still practical and relevant today.
The DPRK participates in the six-party talks with a focus on conducting bilateral negotia- tions with Washington. Although Pyongyang’s“New York channel” is open， the “Beijing platform” remains its real mainstay. Pyongyang threatened to quit the talks more than once， but has never really done so. The significance of the six-party talks should be measured from a long-term perspective， rather than judging short-term success or failure.
The six-party talks have not died out—they are in temporary hibernation at worst. There is no chance that the DPRK will abandon Beijing to make peace with Washington alone. Any arrangement for the peninsula’s future without China’s involvement will not be effectively executed. The reason is that if the regional situation is not complicated enough to involve all parties， the six-party talks framework would not have been established. China is confident that its DPRK policy will not fail due to its strategic positioning on the issue.
China has been strictly carrying out sanctions and restraining measures in accord with UN Security Council resolutions， no less than other countries. Meanwhile， it has been a responsible advocate of nonproliferation against the DPRK. It is irresponsible to condemn China for not participating in sanctions against the DPRK and not accepting international obligations. At the same time， China maintains limited assistance channels toward the DPRK and supports the country’s attempts to integrate into the international system through the establishment of special economic zones. It values changes and the bettering of livelihoods in the DPRK， preventing the country from a humanitarian disaster that might be triggered by sanctions. It also tries to dissuade other countries from taking an aggressive stance that might force Pyongyang to make reckless decisions that may lead to a dead end.
Even if Pyongyang doesn’t understand China’s good intentions， China will not make wrong or careless decisions on issues that closely concern its strategic interests， nor will it fail to make right decisions due to outside pressure. Without the Chinese channel that sustains the DPRK’s survival， there will not be relative peace or stability on the peninsula， today or in the future.
The policy on the DPRK is the backbone of China’s Korean Peninsula strategy. Today’s China is no longer the country it was during the Korean War in the early 1950s， when it was eager to gain a sense of security in the world. There are many more elements for China to consider， a much more solid strategic basis to stand on， and much richer strategic resources to use.
Beijing attaches equal importance to its relationships with Washington， Seoul and Pyongyang. More importantly， it wants to ensure stability and long-lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. And it will be most crucial for China to protect its geopolitical interests and unique influence in the region. China has realized a relative balance of all these goals in a complicated environment. It is unjustified to deem China’s DPRK policy a failure.
If China publicly quarrels with Pyongyang， and their bilateral relationship falls apart， China will lose its unique influence on the Korean Peninsula. That would be the true failure of China’s DPRK policy.
To ensure future peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula， China would rather press Pyongyang， Washington and Seoul to cease inflammatory actions and join in talks rather than exerting pressure solely on the DPRK.
According to them， China’s DPRK policy during the past decades has resulted in failure， suggesting that China should be held respon- sible for instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by the DPRK’s radical behavior. Their understanding is one-sided and incorrect. The critics have missed the point of China’s interests in the DPRK and misunderstood the core of peninsula issues.
Effective policy
The central goal of China’s DPRK policy is to sustain the steady development of bilateral relations. The DPRK is an important partner in China’s foreign strategy and a key point in its diplomacy with neighboring countries. Regardless of the experiences and beliefs of each side， they are neighbors. China cannot simply abandon the DPRK as other governments have done， nor treat the DPRK like a dependent child. It will continue with the current state of communication based on equality and mutual respect.
As a small country， the DPRK’s mentality is particularly sensitive and complicated. It tends to categorize China’s suggestions and different ideas with the label of bully. Although it occasionally lashes out with a temper， it has never diverged from the normal track of China-DPRK relations.
Beijing always stresses the importance of these relations. It welcomes Pyongyang’s increased efforts to promote development， raise people’s living standards， improve its external environment， and conduct normal communication with other countries. It has consistently carried out necessary persuasive actions with Pyongyang in keeping with the strategy of balancing national interests with diplomatic principles. It never seeks to impose its view or development model on Pyongyang. Perhaps China’s influence on the DPRK will not be apparent at once， but the effects will show in time.
The late DPRK leader Kim Jong Il visited China many times， mainly to observe China’s reform and development progress. He also repeatedly urged the DPRK’s younger genera- tion to cherish the China-DPRK relationship and learn more from China’s experience. Current DPRK leader Kim Jong Un most likely shares the same attitude. Now the DPRK has begun to show signs of revitalization， especially since the younger Kim took office. These results could not flourish with a failed DPRK policy. Pushing for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an important goal of China’s DPRK policy. The DPRK nuclear issue has existed for decades， since before the Cold War ended 22 years ago. But the Korean Peninsula has remained in a Cold War state， with lingering hostility between Washington and Pyongyang and between Pyongyang and Seoul.
In spite of the difficulties， China has insisted on mediation through a bilateral channel and the sixparty talks， and succeeded in slowing down the DPRK’s pace of possessing nuclear weapons and discouraging Seoul’s desire to do the same. Its efforts have helped avoid a deteriorating situation， such as a nuclear arms race or even a military conflict on the peninsula. In this sense， China’s DPRK policy is a success， not a failure.
Crucial talks
The six-party talks， initiated and hosted by China， have become the most important platform for China to pursue its DPRK policy. It is already an astonishing feat that the six-party talks have managed to bring the opposing parties together for serious discussions， providing an influence on the Northeast Asian situation since they started 10 years ago. The roadmap to denuclearization and the principle of “commitment for commitment， action for action”adopted during the six-party talks are still practical and relevant today.
The DPRK participates in the six-party talks with a focus on conducting bilateral negotia- tions with Washington. Although Pyongyang’s“New York channel” is open， the “Beijing platform” remains its real mainstay. Pyongyang threatened to quit the talks more than once， but has never really done so. The significance of the six-party talks should be measured from a long-term perspective， rather than judging short-term success or failure.
The six-party talks have not died out—they are in temporary hibernation at worst. There is no chance that the DPRK will abandon Beijing to make peace with Washington alone. Any arrangement for the peninsula’s future without China’s involvement will not be effectively executed. The reason is that if the regional situation is not complicated enough to involve all parties， the six-party talks framework would not have been established. China is confident that its DPRK policy will not fail due to its strategic positioning on the issue.
China has been strictly carrying out sanctions and restraining measures in accord with UN Security Council resolutions， no less than other countries. Meanwhile， it has been a responsible advocate of nonproliferation against the DPRK. It is irresponsible to condemn China for not participating in sanctions against the DPRK and not accepting international obligations. At the same time， China maintains limited assistance channels toward the DPRK and supports the country’s attempts to integrate into the international system through the establishment of special economic zones. It values changes and the bettering of livelihoods in the DPRK， preventing the country from a humanitarian disaster that might be triggered by sanctions. It also tries to dissuade other countries from taking an aggressive stance that might force Pyongyang to make reckless decisions that may lead to a dead end.
Even if Pyongyang doesn’t understand China’s good intentions， China will not make wrong or careless decisions on issues that closely concern its strategic interests， nor will it fail to make right decisions due to outside pressure. Without the Chinese channel that sustains the DPRK’s survival， there will not be relative peace or stability on the peninsula， today or in the future.
The policy on the DPRK is the backbone of China’s Korean Peninsula strategy. Today’s China is no longer the country it was during the Korean War in the early 1950s， when it was eager to gain a sense of security in the world. There are many more elements for China to consider， a much more solid strategic basis to stand on， and much richer strategic resources to use.
Beijing attaches equal importance to its relationships with Washington， Seoul and Pyongyang. More importantly， it wants to ensure stability and long-lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. And it will be most crucial for China to protect its geopolitical interests and unique influence in the region. China has realized a relative balance of all these goals in a complicated environment. It is unjustified to deem China’s DPRK policy a failure.
If China publicly quarrels with Pyongyang， and their bilateral relationship falls apart， China will lose its unique influence on the Korean Peninsula. That would be the true failure of China’s DPRK policy.
To ensure future peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula， China would rather press Pyongyang， Washington and Seoul to cease inflammatory actions and join in talks rather than exerting pressure solely on the DPRK.