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基于博弈论理论,对供应链中的协同管理问题进行分析,构建了信息对称和信息不对称条件下供应链协同模型,并对模型进行了求解、分析。研究发现:完全信息条件下,主导企业无法通过实施报酬差别wH-wL来对附属企业进行激励;不完全信息条件下,主导企业则可以通过共同影响因子:附属企业的能力水平A、附属企业的绝对风险规避度r、附属企业努力成本系数b以及产出稳定性σ2对附属企业进行激励,实现供应链的协同管理。另外研究发现,在信息不对称条件下,考虑成本价格(p和c)的模型结论与不考虑成本价格的模型结论结果会相差(p-c)2倍。因而主导企业可以根据不同条件,采用不同的措施来优化供应链模式,最终实现供应链协同效应。
Based on game theory, this paper analyzes the problem of collaborative management in supply chain, constructs the supply chain collaborative model under information symmetry and information asymmetry, and solves and analyzes the model. The study found that: under the condition of complete information, leading enterprises can not encourage affiliated enterprises through the implementation of wage difference wH-wL; under incomplete information, leading enterprises can use common influence factors: The absolute risk aversion r, the affiliated firm’s cost of effort coefficient b, and the output stability σ2 to motivate the affiliated enterprises to realize the coordinated management of the supply chain. In addition, we find that under the condition of information asymmetry, the model conclusion considering the cost price (p and c) is 2 times different (p-c) from the model conclusion not considering the cost price. Therefore, leading enterprises can adopt different measures to optimize the supply chain model according to different conditions and ultimately achieve synergies in the supply chain.