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我国国有企业普遍效益“不佳”是值得置疑的.博弈分析发现:对国有企业的财务监督不足和现有的经营者选拔考核机制所存在的问题决定了国有企业不一定会如实上报自己的盈利状况;而在相同条件下,变动收入的经营者比固定收入的经营者作假的可能性更大.国企经营者隐瞒利润的根本动机是为了维护自身的地位,要解决国有企业说假话的问题必须同时从加强审计和改善选拔考核机制上入手.
It is doubtful that the general efficiency of state-owned enterprises in our country is “poor”. The game analysis found that: The lack of financial supervision of state-owned enterprises and the problems existing in the evaluation mechanism of existing managers determine that state-owned enterprises will not necessarily report their own profits. Conditions; under the same conditions, operators with variable income are more likely to be false than those with fixed income. The fundamental motivation for state-owned enterprise managers to conceal profits is to maintain their status and to solve the issue of state-owned companies Must start with strengthening auditing and improving selection and assessment mechanisms.