基于经典博弈和行为博弈理论建立博弈模型,以供应链上低碳企业无公平偏好为参照,对比研究了低碳企业具有公平偏好时,消费者低碳产品购买倾向和政府补贴对供应链企业决策的影响。分析结果表明:低碳企业的总体效用受其公平偏好的影响较大,在不同的政府补贴水平或消费者低碳产品购买倾向下,其不公平厌恶程度对自身效用的影响也有显著差异;当某一行业低碳产品处于起步阶段时,如果政府补贴不足,那么低碳企业的总体效用将会随着其不公平厌恶程度的增大而愈发减少,将不利于低碳企业的长期发展。 Based on the classic game theory and the game theory of game theory, a game model is set up and the non-fair preference of low-carbon enterprises in the supply chain is taken as a reference. When low-carbon enterprises have fair preference, consumers’ preference of purchasing low-carbon products and government subsidies to supply chain enterprises Impact. The analysis results show that the overall utility of low-carbon enterprises is greatly influenced by their fair preference, and the effects of unfair aversion on their own utility are significantly different at different levels of government subsidies or consumers’ buying tendency of low-carbon products. When an industry low-carbon product is in its infancy, if the government subsidies are insufficient, the overall effectiveness of low-carbon enterprises will decrease as their unfair aversion increases, which will not be conducive to the long-term development of low-carbon enterprises.