涉诉信访在增加公民利益表达机制、拓展司法权监督渠道、推动法制改革进程等方面起了重大的推动作用,建立科学实用的风险预警与危机应对机制,对有效化解或减少危害社会稳定问题的发生具有重大意义。本文首次应用博弈论方法分析涉诉信访的风险防范策略,建立涉诉信访的完全信息和不完全信息的静态博弈模型,分析人民法院司法配置的最优策略。模型结果表明,人民法院可从风险预警模型中得到当事人易于上访的先验概率,然后基于博弈模型的贝叶斯均衡进行司法资源配置,合理防范涉诉信访风险。本文将博弈论模型均衡结果与风险预警模型相结合,创新性地提出了防范涉诉信访风险的应对策略。 Petition letters and visits have played a significant role in promoting the expression of citizen interests, expanding the channels of judicial power supervision and promoting the process of legal system reform, establishing a scientific and practical risk warning and crisis response mechanism, and effectively resolving or reducing the problems that endanger social stability It is of great significance. This article first applies game theory to analyze the risk prevention strategies of petitioning petitions, builds a static game model of complete information and incomplete information about petition petitions, and analyzes the optimal strategy of judicial allocation of people’s courts. The results of the model show that the People’s Court can obtain the prior probability of the parties being vulnerable to petitions from the risk early warning model, and then allocate the judicial resources based on the Bayesian equilibrium of the game model to reasonably prevent the petitioning and petitioning risks. In this paper, we combine the equilibrium result of game theory model with the risk early warning model, and put forward the innovative countermeasures to prevent the risk of petitioning and visiting.