论文部分内容阅读
哈贝马斯的交往伦理学部分地弥补了传统自由主义正义理论对差异缺乏敏感性的局限,但他的普遍化原则(U原则)和话语伦理原则(D原则)忽视了交往情境的差异,并在理性与情感、公共性与私人性等方面做了不恰当的二元区分,因而未能逃脱普遍主义的道德和政治困境。S.本哈比试图通过区分“普遍的他者”和“具体的他者”对交往伦理学进行修正,但她对交往关系“对称性互惠”的强调无法处理社会政治领域中广泛存在的“非对称性互惠”现象。在交往中,道德主体与政治主体是不可替代的,每一个参与者由于在交往情境中所处的位置不同,彼此之间具有非对称的、不可逆的交往关系。艾利斯·扬提出了“非对称性互惠”的交往伦理学概念,以期提供一种包容差异的正义理论。
Habermas’s communicative ethics partially makes up for the lack of sensitivity of traditional liberalism theory to differences, but his universalization principle (U principle) and discourse ethics principle (D principle) neglect the differences in communicative context, And made an inappropriate dual distinction between reason and emotion, publicity and personal nature, failing to escape the moral and political predicament of universalism. S. Benjamin attempts to correct communicative ethics by distinguishing “universal other ” and “specific other ”, but her emphasis on relationships “symmetry reciprocity ” fails to address social politics Widely existing in the field “Asymmetric reciprocity ” phenomenon. In the interaction, the moral subject and the political subject are irreplaceable. Each participant has asymmetrical and irreversible relations with each other due to the different positions in the interaction situation. Alice Young proposed the concept of communicative ethics of “asymmetric reciprocity” with a view to providing a theory of justice that embraces diversity.