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比价工具作为一种集中披露分散信息的有效手段,其应用将增加消费者端市场透明度,进而影响B2C市场寡头零售商间竞合行为。本文基于产品差异度约束条件,建立单阶段竞争和多阶段合谋的双寡头Hotelling模型,通过对其纯战略、混合战略和触发战略纳什均衡分析,探讨了比价工具对默契合谋的影响机理。本文证明:在具有一定产品差异度的B2C市场上,随着消费者越来越广泛的使用比价工具,网络零售商间默契合谋的难度将随之增加。而在近似同质化产品市场上,这种效应却基本消失了。此时,比价工具的应用对网络零售商间默契合谋没有影响。本文为各大B2C平台间经营品类的同质化现象提供了一个全新的经济学解释。
As an effective tool for centralized disclosure of diversified information, parity tools will increase the transparency of consumer-end markets and affect the competition among oligopolistic retailers in the B2C market. Based on the product diversity constraints, this paper establishes a duopoly Hotelling model with single-stage competition and multi-stage collusion. By analyzing its pure strategy, mixed strategy and triggering strategy Nash equilibrium, the paper explores the mechanism by which parity tools affect tacit collusion. This paper proves that in the B2C market with a certain degree of product differentiation, the difficulty of tacit collusion between online retailers will increase as consumers use the price instruments more and more widely. In the near homogenization of the product market, this effect has basically disappeared. At this point, the application of parity tools has no effect on the tacit collusion between online retailers. This article provides a brand new economic explanation for the homogeneity of business categories among major B2C platforms.