<正>What are the prospects for devising mutually advantageous global international agreements to address climate change? An analysis of interacting climate change policies involving developed and developing nations is provided that examines the prospects for overcoming incentive-related inefficiencies to come up with self-enforcing international agreements.The model accounts for both external benefits contingent on mitigation and for possible carbon leakages.Cases where mitigation efforts should be concentrated in particular countries and where desired outcomes should be fostered by international trade in emission permits are discussed.Situations where intractable Prisoner’s Dilemma incentive problems can be transformed,using policy,into more tractable Assurance,Leadership and Chicken Games are analysed.The role of policy commitments in a global setting are analysed and the strategic implications of pursuing ’no regrets’ policies are discussed.Dynamic and repeated game formulations are studied in environments where climate change is steadily reducing global welfare and where there are increasing costs of mitigation and adaptation responses.