What is the role of time and computation in our domain of knowledge when we are being rational and experiencing information objects? What do we know automatically with others when we are acting logically in concert through common knowledge and common memory? Computational experiences are sui gcneris experiences and possess a cognitive continuity with respect to intuition and information.Whether computation entails a particular temporal significance since Turing due to his algorithmic methodology for general problem solving is an open question.As far back as Descartes, the concept of time in his Rules implied ones ability for grasping intuitive concepts is perfected upon a simultaneous view of the action, a cross-sectional or latitudinal perspective of a present moment.Indeed, for Descartes this immediate or instantaneous intellectual vision lessens reliance on memory.One repeatedly re-views more complex chains of connected simple implications until they become serf-evident.On the other hand Turing, as did Wiener, explored the longitudinal dimension of experience, ultimately transforming moments of simples through atomic steps which each replace a whole present with another in the serialized or sequenced transition of states.As a consequence of the perspectival shift of presentism from latitudinal to longitudinal, I adapt the replacement theory of time advocated by Grupp to account for an asynchronous logical interface between data and information, by way of intuition and computing.This liminal philosophy of time leads towards an explication of states and shared memories in an informational construction of Gilberts common knowledge.