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在证券市场改革日益深入的今天,股权的高度集中使控制权问题更加明显。随着股权分置改革的完成,在全流通情况下,一些新的公司治理问题将逐步显现。本文以我国上市公司控制权私人收益问题为研究对象,以2008年~2011年间发生的80起涉及控制权转移的协议转让交易为样本,实证检验了股权转让比例、变更后控股股东的持股比例、股权集中度、股权制衡度、独立董事比例、公司规模、代理问题以及财务杠杆对控制权私人收益的影响。研究发现控制权私人收益与股权转让比例正相关,与变更股权后控股股东的持股比例负相关。控制权私人收益与股权集中度正相关,与股权制衡度负相关。控制权私人收益与两职合一正相关,与独立董事比例负相关。控制权私人收益与代理成本正相关。
Today, with the deepening of stock market reform, the high concentration of stock rights makes the issue of control more obvious. With the completion of the split share structure reform, some new corporate governance issues will gradually emerge under full circulation. In this paper, the issue of the private benefits of control of listed companies in China is taken as the research object. Eighty cases involving transfer of control rights between 2008 and 2011 are taken as samples to test empirically the proportion of equity transfer and the proportion of controlling shareholders after the change , Ownership concentration, equity balance, the proportion of independent directors, the size of the company, agency issues and the impact of financial leverage on private benefits of control. The study finds that the private benefits of control are positively related to the proportion of equity transfer and negatively related to the proportion of controlling shareholders after the change of equity. The private benefits of control are positively related to the concentration of ownership and negatively related to the balance of equity. The private benefits of control were positively correlated with the two positions and negatively correlated with the proportion of independent directors. Private benefits of control are positively correlated with agency costs.