本文着重考察两人管理团队中搭便车的古典问题。与纯道德风险问题不同,我们设想企业中的个人能力也会影响团队的产出。应用一个两期模型,我们表明在一个阿尔钦—德莫塞茨型企业中,即使进行有限期博弈,每个成员的努力水平也会比传统理论预测的高。我们认为这是由于团队成员间的相互可观测性引起的。因此我们可认为,管理团队中的自我激励机制的存在缓解了搭便车现象,这也可能是团队组织存在的原因。 This article focuses on the classical issues of free riding in a two-man management team. In contrast to purely moral hazard issues, we envisage that the individual skills in the firm also affect the team’s output. Applying a two-period model, we show that in a Archie-de-Mosce-type firm, each member’s level of effort will be higher than predicted by traditional theory, even for a limited period game. We think this is due to the mutual observability among team members. Therefore, we can think that the existence of self-motivation mechanism in the management team has alleviated the free-riding phenomenon, and this may also be the reason why the team organization exists.