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本文以中国经济为背景,借助博弈模型从理论上探讨了存在区域差异、包含两级政府的经济中的政府竞争问题。我们导入了两种不同的征税体制,综合分析了中央领导下的政府竞争、地区分权下的政府竞争和同时行动的政府竞争模式下的竞争均衡的效率性以及相应的最优征税机制设定问题,并进一步讨论了政府竞争对区域经济差异的影响。分析表明,区域政府竞争可能导致效率的损失,要实现经济的最优状态,中央政府必须设定适当的征税机制以激励地区政府在选择时兼顾对其他地区的影响,适当的财政政策设计可以使竞争兼顾效率与公平。
Based on the Chinese economy, this paper uses the game model to theoretically discuss the issue of government competition in the economy that has regional differences and includes two levels of government. We have introduced two different taxation systems and analyzed the efficiency of the competition equilibrium under the leadership of the central government, the government competition under the decentralization of power and the government competitive mode with simultaneous decentralization and the corresponding optimal taxation mechanism Set the issue, and further discussed the impact of government competition on regional economic differences. The analysis shows that the competition of regional governments may lead to the loss of efficiency. To achieve the optimal economic conditions, the central government must set appropriate taxation mechanisms to encourage regional governments to balance their influence on other regions in their choices. Appropriate fiscal policy design can Make competition both efficient and fair.