论文部分内容阅读
当代企业制度下,所有权与经营权两权分离,导致出现代理问题。为解决代理问题,股东与高管签订以会计盈余为基础的薪酬契约。然而,高管为最大化自身利益,有动机通过盈余管理提高薪酬报酬。本文主要研究高管薪酬与盈余管理之间是否存在正相关关系。通过采用2008年-2010年上市公司数据进行实证研究,研究结果表明:高管薪酬与盈余管理呈正相关。
Under the contemporary enterprise system, the separation of ownership and right of management leads to agency problem. In order to solve the agency problem, shareholders and senior executives sign a pay contract based on accounting earnings. However, to maximize their own interests, executives have the incentive to raise their remuneration through earnings management. This paper mainly studies whether there is a positive correlation between executive compensation and earnings management. Empirical research using the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2010 shows that there is a positive correlation between executive compensation and earnings management.